The marginal cost of public funds (MCF ) measures the cost to the economy of raising government revenue. The MCF can be used to guide reform of the tax system and to determine an e¢ cient level of government expenditure. It can also be used as an input into cost-bene…t analysis. Previous applications of the concept have developed a methodology in a context of a static economy. We develop the methodology of the MCF to extend the concept to growing economies. The extended concept is then applied to variants of the Barro endogenous growth model with a productive public input. The MCF is used to address the choice between labour and capital taxes and to explore the implications of infrastructural spill-overs across regions.
Introduction
All implementable government tax instruments are distortionary and, as a consequence, impose deadweight losses upon the economy. These distortions are the inevitable cost of collecting the …nance required to support public spending.
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The correct level of spending achieves a compromise between these distortions and the bene…ts of spending. There are large literatures on cost-bene…t analysis (Mishan and Quah, 2007) and optimal taxation (Myles, 1995 ) that describe how this should be done. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF ) provides the link between these literatures since it measures the cost of raising revenue which is determined by the degree of e¢ ciency of the tax system. The existing literature on the MCF is almost entirely restricted to static economies. 1 In contrast, there is now a considerable body of work on optimal tax structures in growing economies. The purpose of this paper is to show how the concept of the MCF can be extended and applied to economies with growth. The results from using the extended MCF are then linked to the Chamley-Judd results on optimal taxation.
What matters for the spending decision is whether the marginal bene…t of spending exceeds the marginal cost of taxation. If it does, then additional public spending is justi…ed. This principle of contrasting marginal bene…t and marginal cost underlies the methodology of cost-bene…t analysis. The survey of Drèze and Stern (1987) provides a summary of the standard approach to costbene…t analysis that emphasizes the role of the MCF. That approach is based on the Arrow-Debreu representation of the competitive economy and its extensions. The generality of the model permits it to encompass many situations but for speci…c problems alternative models can be advantageous. The questions we wish to focus upon involve economic growth. Although growth can be handled by dating commodities in the Arrow-Debreu framework it does seem preferable to employ a more speci…c model of the growth process. The models we analyze in this paper are extensions of the Barro model of endogenous growth with productive public expenditure. We also combine the endogenous growth model with …scal federalism and the public input interpreted as a form of infrastructure that has spill-overs between jurisdictions.
A government has access to a wide range of di¤erent tax instruments. Taxes can be levied on consumption or on income. Di¤erent forms of consumption, and di¤erent sources of income, can be taxed at di¤erent rates. Taxes can also be levied on …rms, using pro…t, turnover, or input use as a base. The cost of collecting revenue will depend upon the tax base that is chosen and the structure of rates that are levied. Each tax instrument has an associated MCF which is a measure of the cost of raising tax revenue using that tax. The values of the MCF for individual tax instruments can be used to identify changes to the tax structure that raise welfare keeping expenditure constant. They can also identify the best tax instruments to use for raising additional revenue. When the tax system is e¢ cient the value of the MCF is equalized across tax instruments and can be used to determine the optimal level of expenditure. The MCF is a practical tool that permits consistent analysis of taxation choices. Dahlby (2008) provides a detailed summary of the existing methods for calculating the MCF in a wide variety of circumstances and for a range of tax instruments. However, there is very little literature on the derivation of the MCF for a growing economy.
Section 2 of the paper provides a brief review of the MCF from a cost-bene…t perspective and a summary of several typical applications. Some of the issues involved in applying the MCF to growing economies are discussed in Section 3. A general discussion of the MCF for a growing economy is given in Section 4. Section 5 analyses a basic model of endogenous growth and Section 6 extends the model to incorporate infrastructural spill-overs and tax externalities. Section 7 provides concluding comments.
Application of the MCF
The MCF provides a numerical summary of the welfare cost of raising additional revenue from each tax instrument. Consider the e¤ect of a marginal increase in a single rate of tax. This has two e¤ects: it will raise additional revenue for the government (provided the economy is on the "correct" side of the La¤er curve) but will reduce social welfare. The MCF is de…ned as (minus) the ratio of the welfare e¤ect to the revenue e¤ect so it gives the welfare reduction per unit of additional revenue.
A formal construction of the MCF can be provided as follows. Consider an economy that can employ m tax instruments to …nance g public goods. Denote the level of tax instrument i by i and the quantity of public good j by G j . Welfare is given by the social welfare function W ( ; G) where = ( 1 ; :::; n ) and G = (G 1 ; :::; G g ), the level of revenue by R ( ; G), and the cost of the public good supply by C (G). Note that there is an interaction in the revenue function between taxes and public good supply but the cost of public goods is determined by technology alone.
The optimization problem for the government is 2 max f ;Gg
To analyze the solution to this optimization de…ne i by
The term i is the Marginal Cost of Funds from tax instrument i. It measures the cost, in units of welfare, of raising an additional unit of revenue.
3 If the tax system is e¢ cient then i is equalized across the di¤erent tax instruments: i = ; for all i, and equals the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government's budget constraint. (The converse does not necessarily hold: the common value can be negative, implying that the level of revenue is falling as taxes increase, or even zero. Neither situation is e¢ cient.) If the value of i di¤ers across tax instruments then welfare can be raised by collecting more revenue from taxes with low (but positive) i and less revenue from those with high i . Now assume that the tax instruments have been optimized so that i = > 0. The use of the MCF in project choice can be illustrated by writing the optimality condition for the level of public good j as
This conditions says that the quantity of provision of each public good is optimal when the marginal bene…t of that extra provision (@W=@G j ) is equal to the net cost of the public good (@C=@G j @R=@G j ) converted into welfare units using the MCF.
The properties of i and are investigated in Hashimzade and Myles (2013) . Assume that @W=@ i is negative for low i but may become zero for high i (if the tax is su¢ ciently high to discourage the respective activity), and that @R=@ i is positive for low i (the "upward" slope of the La¤er curve), possibly negative for higher i ; and, eventually, may become zero. Under these assumptions it is shown that i can, in principle, take any value, including 1, or can be unde…ned (when both @W=@ i and @R=@ i are zero). It also has a discontinuity at the value of i that maximizes revenue (given the value of other tax instruments).
The de…nition in (2) shows that i and are denominated in units of welfare/revenue and that can be used to convert monetary costs into welfare equivalents. Furthermore, i and are unique only up to multiplicative transformation, both in the cases when W ( ; G) is ordinal or cardinal. That is, given n tax instruments, for every permissible transformation of the social welfare function there is a choice of n di¤erent numeraires for revenue and each results in a di¤erent numerical value for i and . Another way to look at this is that i is denominated in units of welfare/revenue, and its value changes when we change the units of measurement for either welfare or revenue. One response to this fact is to accept that i provides only a ranking of tax instruments (and , respectively, provides a ranking of the e¢ cient tax systems) for a given transformation of the welfare function and choice of numeraire. In other words, the ranking is ordinal, and so the numerical value is not in itself meaningful. An alternative response is to develop a unit-free form of the MCF that is not a¤ected by transformation of the social welfare function or choice of numeraire.
To produce a unit-free version of the i let be any quantity measured in welfare/revenue units. Then a normalized form of the i is given by
For given the value of N i is uniquely de…ned since any transformation of the welfare function or choice of numeraire must be applied to v as well as i . However, this does not make the measure unique since the tax rates and public good levels at which the normalizing factor, , is evaluated, need to be chosen. Di¤erent choice will provide di¤erent numerical values of N i . This point can be seen by considering a model with a representative consumer. In that case one can use the private marginal utility of income 4 as the normalizing factor. The value of the marginal utility will depend on and G at which it is evaluated. The choose of speci…c values, denoted n^ ;Ĝ o ; is constrained by the requirement at R ^ ;Ĝ C b G ; each choice satisfying this condition is equally acceptable but will result in a di¤erent numerical value for N i . Hashimzade and Myles (2013) also observe that a unit-free MCF can be obtained by using the compensating variation or equivalent variation to measure welfare change (see also Diamond and McFadden, 1974) . If this is done the basic logic for applying the MCF is very easily described. Consider raising the income tax rate so that an extra e1 is collected from a taxpayer. Now o¤er the taxpayer the alternative of paying some amount to the treasury in order to avoid the income tax increase. If the taxpayer is willing to pay at most e1.20 then the MCF is 1.2. Expressed alternatively, if the MCF is 1.2 an additional euro of government revenue imposes a cost of e1.20 on the taxpayer. The two ways in which the MCF enters cost-bene…t analysis then follow directly. First, the MCF can be used to judge which projects should be adopted. Continuing the example above, a project that costs the government e1 and produces bene…ts of e1.15 appears on the surface to be bene…cial. However, if the MCF is e1.20 then the marginal bene…t of the project falls short of the actual marginal cost faced by the taxpayer. The project should therefore not be adopted. Second, the MCF can be employed to assess and improve the e¢ ciency of the tax system. If the tax structure is ine¢ cient the MCF will be unnecessarily high. This will reduce the range of projects that pass any given cost-bene…t criterion. The MCF can be used to guide the improvement of the e¢ ciency of the tax system and therefore increase the number of bene…cial projects. In our example, if revision to the structure of income taxation reduced the MCF to e1.10 then the project with bene…ts of e1.15 should be accepted.
We would like to emphasize that using the comparison of the numerical values for the MCF obtained under di¤erent normalization and di¤erent welfare measures is inappropriate. Furthermore, using the extent to which the MCF for a particular tax instrument di¤ers from 1 as the measure of the degree of distortion of that instrument can be misleading. This is an important point since many applications implicitly assume that an MCF of 1 represents a nondistortionary tax instrument and that any distortionary tax must have an MCF in excess of 1. In fact, as shown in Atkinson and Stern (1974) , the MCF calculated using normalization by the private marginal utility of income can be less than 1 for a distortionary tax system (labour income tax) if the income e¤ect on labor supply is su¢ ciently negative. It should also be stressed that the use of "money-metric" welfare measures avoids the issues connected with normalization but raises another di¢ culty: the aggregation of the money-metric measure across heterogeneous consumers. This is an issue for which there is no compelling resolution (Hammond, 1994) .
This non-uniqueness in the de…nition of the MCF is linked to the discussion of the use of the di¤erential approach versus the balanced-budget approach to the analysis of the welfare cost of taxation (Ballard, 1990) . Di¤erential analysis compares alternative means of raising the same amount of revenue, whereas the balanced-budget analysis is concerned with a change in the level of revenue and a simultaneous change of the tax system to …nance this additional revenue. The numerical value can be very sensitive to the choice of the welfare measure and the reference point, as shown in Triest (1990) . While a chosen normalization can be used to compare the extent of welfare loss under two di¤erent distortionary tax instruments, it cannot be meaningfully used to measure the extent of welfare loss under one particular distortionary tax system.
There is substantial literature on the application of the MCF showing how it can be used to optimize the tax structure and to determine whether a public project is welfare-enhancing (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001 ), or to compare the degree of distortion of various tax instruments. For example, Parry (2003) considers the excise taxes on petroleum, alcoholic drinks, and cigarettes in the UK. It is shown that petroleum taxes are the most distortionary of the instruments and the cigarette taxes are the least distortionary. These calculations demonstrate that the current system is only optimal if the goods have external e¤ects or di¤er in the degree of tax shifting. The role of tax shifting is explored in Delipalla and O'Donnell (2001) . Many applications of the MCF are undertaken for linear tax structures but Dahlby (1998) shows how the MCF can be extended to accommodate a progressive income tax. The approach of Dahlby is applied in a study of the Japanese income tax system by Bessho and Hayahi (2005) . A alternative extension is made by Kleven and Kreiner (2006) who show how labour force participation can be included in a measure of the MCF. They calculate the MCF for …ve European countries and show that incorporating the participation margin can signi…cantly increase the MCF in some circumstances. Poapangsakorn et al. (2000) employ the MCF in a cost-bene…t analysis of a tax enforcement programme in Thailand and conclude that the tax enforcement programme was a high-cost method of raising revenue. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) analyze the MCF of public sector debt when interest payments on debt are …nanced by a distortionary tax on total output. Debt …nance can smooth the MCF over time when a lumpy project is …nanced. This can lead to a signi…cant welfare gain.
To summarize, a set of techniques has been developed in the formal literature that permit the MCF to be calculated and to be integrated into cost-bene…t analysis. Numerous further examples of such applications are described in the comprehensive text of Dahlby (2008) . However, despite this extensive literature there are still a number of signi…cant issues that need to be addressed if the MCF is to be used e¤ectively in policy design.
The MCF, Economic Growth, and Externalities
The analysis of the MCF given above is very general and, conceptually, can be applied to any economy. The cost of this generality is an absence of detail concerning the economic model behind the welfare function and the cost function. This observation becomes important when the MCF is applied to practical policy questions. For example, applying the MCF to the case of an economy with multiple jurisdiction or an economic union, such as the EU, raises several questions. First, the use of a single objective function is an issue in an integrated economic area but with subsidiarity permitting independence in policy. Secondly, the economic integration ampli…es externalities between member states of the EU or between jurisdictions in a federal state, that are not captured by the general formulation. Finally, the relationship between …scal policy and economic growth has emerged in recent years as a focal point for the attention of EU policy makers. In contrast, almost all analysis of the MCF has been undertaken for static economies. The implication of these comments is that there are bene…ts to be obtained by re…ning the analysis of the MCF to apply in a growth model with multiple jurisdictions. The formal developments of the MCF have been based upon the Arrow-Debreu model which can incorporate time in the form of dated commodities but must have all contracts agreed prior to the commencement of economic activity. Consequently, it is not a compelling representation of the growth process. Similarly, the applications of the MCF reviewed are typically set within a single-country model. Such a re…nement would need to include the role of individual member states and the externalities that link the member states. Dahlby and Wilson (2003) make some progress in this respect by analyzing a model that includes …scal externalities. Their model has both a central government and a local government. Both governments levy taxes on labour incomes and pro…t, which gives rise to vertical tax externalities linking the two levels of government. The main result is the demonstration that a local government that does not take into account the e¤ect of its choices on the central government may have an MCF that is biased up or down.
Endogenous growth occurs when capital and labour are augmented by additional inputs in a production function that otherwise has non-increasing returns to scale. One interesting case for understanding the link between government policy and growth is when the additional input is a public good or public infrastructure …nanced by taxation. The need for public infrastructure to support private capital in production provides a positive role for public expenditure and a direct mechanism through which policy can a¤ect growth. Introducing infrastructure permits an analysis of the optimal level of public expenditure in an endogenous growth model.
The importance of infrastructure is widely recognized, not least by the EU which pursues an active programme to support the investment activities of member states. The policy problem facing the EU is to ensure that member states undertake an e¢ cient level of infrastructural expenditure that ensures the maximum rate of growth. The determination of the level has to take into account the full consequences of an infrastructure project for the EU, not just the direct bene…ts for the member state undertaking the investment. The MCF can be used to evaluate public infrastructure provision but its use has to recognize three signi…cant issues. First, infrastructural investment has signi…cant spillovers across member states. Second, mobility of the tax base results in tax externalities between the member states, and between the member states and the EU. Third, the EU is faced with a decision on how to allocate support for infrastructural expenditure across the di¤erent member states. This interacts with the process of revenue-raising, and with the extent to which the projects are …nanced jointly by the EU and member states. The same is true of the relationship between the local and central government …nancing in a federal state.
The economic modelling of the impact of infrastructure on economic growth has focussed on the Barro (1990) model of public expenditure as a public input and its extensions (Chen et al. 2005 , Turnovsky, 1999 . This literature has identi…ed the concept of an optimal level of expenditure, and has highlighted the deleterious e¤ects of both inadequate and excessive expenditure. These are important insights, but they do not address the spill-over issues that confront a federation. Infrastructural spill-overs between the members of a federation can be positive, which occurs when improvements in infrastructure in one region raise productivity in another, or they can be negative if they induce relocation of capital between regions. In either case, it is important that the consequences of spill-overs are addressed in order for the role of productive public expenditure to be fully understood. Ignoring either form of spill-over will result in an ine¢ cient level and allocation of expenditure.
The EU single-market programme has increased the degree of capital mobility. The ‡ow of capital provides an important mechanism for equalizing growth rates. An economy with a high rate of growth will pay a high return to capital. This will attract an in ‡ow of mobile capital and a consequent reduction in the return. It will also increase the level of GDP but decrease the growth rate. The converse in true for countries experiencing capital out ‡ows. Hence, mobility of capital will equalize the growth rate across countries and increased mobility will reduce the time taken for this process to operate. The observation that capital ‡ows reduce growth di¤erentials between countries has been made previously by Razin and Yuen (1997) . They argued that labour mobility equalized incomes across countries when there were human capital externalities. Similar issues have also been addressed by Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997) , but in a model that does not have public infrastructure. The e¤ect of these capital ‡ows is to make government policy even more important than in a world without spillovers, since additional public infrastructure in one country can raise the growth rate in all. This gives further emphasis to the development of an appropriate concept of the MCF.
Dynamic Setting
There has been little investigation of the MCF in growing economies. Two exceptions are Liu (2003) who computes the MCF as a component of a costbene…t analysis (but taking the intertemporal path of wage rates and interest rates as exogenous) and Dahlby (2006) who uses the MCF to analyze public debt in an AK growth model. Our approach is similar to Dahlby but we employ a more general model of endogenous growth. In principle, it is possible to treat the economy lying behind (1) as intertemporal but the analysis needs to be more speci…c to generate worthwhile conclusions.
Consider an intertemporal economy set in discrete time. The time path for tax instrument i is a sequence o . We choose to focus on sustained variations. Correspondingly, we extend the de…nition of the MCF for a static economy to an intertemporal economy by using
to denote the MCF of a sustained variation in tax instrument i from period t onwards. In this setting W is the intertemporal social welfare function, and R is discounted value of tax revenue. In a dynamic, in…nite horizon economy
where R t is tax revenue in period t, and d (t) is the discount factor applied to revenues in period t: There are many well-known issues involved in the choice of the sequence of discount factors fd (t)g. We choose to remain with the standard convention (see, for example, Nordhaus 2008) of appealing to market equilibrium to determine the social rate of time preference endogenously. In this case
where C t is consumption at time t. If the welfare function is time-separable with exponential discounting, that is,
The purpose of the analysis is to apply the MCF in settings where economic growth is occurring. This requires us to embed the MCF within a model of endogenous growth. The major di¢ cultly here is that, generally, the entire intertemporal path for the economy must be computed from the present into the inde…nite future. To overcome this di¢ culty we focus upon balanced growth paths. Along a balanced growth path all real variables grow at the same rate, so such a path can be interpreted as describing the pattern of long-run growth. All the commonly used growth models have the property that the economy will converge to a balanced growth path from an arbitrary initial position.
Public Infrastructure in Barro Model
This section develops the MCF for a growing economy by building on the Barro (1990) model of productive public expenditure. In particular, the model is used to illustrate the bene…ts of focussing on the balanced growth path. This analysis provides the developments that we need to combine endogenous growth with …scal federalism and infrastructural spill-overs in Section 6.
Public infrastructure is introduced by assuming that the production function for the representative …rm at time t has the form
where A is a positive constant and G t is the quantity of public infrastructure. The form of this production function ensures that there are constant returns to scale in labour, L t , and private capital, K t , for the …rm given a …xed level of public infrastructure. Although returns are decreasing to private capital as the level of capital is increased for …xed levels of labour and public input, there are constant returns to scale in public input and private capital together.
With denoting the tax upon output, the pro…t level of the …rm is
where r t is the interest rate and w t the wage rate. Pro…t maximization requires that the use of capital satis…es the necessary condition
This can be solved to give
where
The …rm belongs to a representative in…nitely-lived household whose preferences are described by an instantaneous utility function, U (C t ; L t ). The household maximizes the in…nite discounted stream of utility, W = P 1 t=0 t U (C t ; L t ), subject to the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints
and with the sequence of taxes and government infrastructure taken as given.
Here K is the rate of depreciation of private capital. We can write the …rst-order conditions for the optimal consumption path as
The public capital input is …nanced by the tax on output, and there is no government debt, so that the government budget constraint is
On a balanced growth path the real variables (Y t ; C t ; K t ; G t ) grow at the same constant rate, . Markets also clear in every period and r t = r for all t.
We assume for this analysis that labour supply is constant, and normalize it to one, L t = 1: On a balanced growth path C t+1 = (1 + ) C t where is the rate of growth. Assuming the logarithmic form for the instantaneous utility function, U (C t ) = ln (C t ), the …rst-order conditions (9) become
Using (7), (8), and (10), the following set of equations obtains for the balanced growth path:
where c C t =K t is the consumption to capital ratio. The model permits a closed-form solution for all endogenous variables. In particular, for the growth rate we have
The growth rate is maximized at = 1 .
MCF with Output Tax
Along the balanced growth path when utility is logarithmic, the discount factor de…ned in (5) is
which implies
The MCF is calculated with g constant so assuming the sustained variation in the tax occurs from period 0 onwards:
For the welfare function with logarithmic utility we have
where c C t =K t . This implies
Combining (17) and (19) allows the MCF to be computed as
Following Dahlby (2006) we de…ne the normalized MCF by dividing in (20) by the marginal utility of income at time 0 (denoted by I 0 ),
@W=@ @R=@
This provides a unit-free measure of the cost of public funds. For the speci…ca-tion of utility in this model the marginal utility of income at time 0 is given by 1=C 0 = 1=cK 0 . Hence, using (20),
From (11)- (13) it is easy to obtain c = 1
and, therefore,
where is given by (14). Figure 1 plots the values of the key endogenous variables against the level of the tax. Here, and in other model speci…cations used later in the paper, we employ values for the model's parameters that are broadly consistent with the calibration of business cycle and growth models; see, for example, Cooley and Prescott (1995) . In this speci…cation of the economy the level of welfare is an increasing function of the growth rate, and so is at a maximum when the growth rate is highest, that is, at = 1 . The same is true of the consumption to capital ratio and the normalized marginal cost of funds. For low levels of the tax rate growth is negative because of insu¢ cient provision of public infrastructure. It can be seen that N in this calibration is everywhere above 1. We can now use the expression for N in (21) to verify that the optimality condition (3) holds in this model, which is the implication of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result. To derive the Diamond-Mirrlees result, observe that in the balanced growth path equilibrium Y t = AK t g 1 , and in the dynamic setting the marginal bene…t calculated as the in…nite discounted sum of the marginal productivities in every time period, with the discount factor (15),
With the tax on output the marginal bene…t is is an increase in welfare (normalized by the marginal utility of income at time 0):
From (18),
and, using (11)-(12),
The optimality condition requires
or, using (16), (21), and (24),
which is exactly the same as (23) for the lump-sum tax …nancing of the public input, i.e. the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result that optimal tax system does not distort production decision holds in this situation.
MCF with Input Taxes
We now analyze a dynamic economy described in the previous section under alternative assumptions about …nancing of the public input in production. In particular, it is interesting to compare the M CF in equilibrium under the output tax with the M CF in equilibrium under taxes on capital and labour. First, we analyze the case with inelastic labour supply and a tax on private capital. Next, we add labour supply as a choice variable to the model and consider government spending …nanced by taxes on capital input and labour income. These taxes distorts the choice of inputs so the M CF will re ‡ect this. We also assume that public infrastructure can be accumulated as a stock.
Capital Tax
In this section we assume that government spending is funded from a tax levied on the private capital input. The consumers'optimization problem remains the same as described in section 4.1. The tax on the private capital input is denoted by K 5 . We now assume that the public capital stock accumulates over time by assuming that the depreciation rate is G 2 [0; 1]. Again, there is no government debt so the government budget constraint at time t is
On the balanced growth path the real variables (Y t ; C t ; K t ; G t ; w t ) grow at the same constant rate, . Markets also clear in every period, the interest rate is constant, and the available labour is normalized to one. The normalized version of the MCF in this economy is given by
The details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix. This model does not permit a closed-form solution; however, we show that N is strictly increasing in the tax rate, whereas the growth rate is maximized when the tax solves link between the growth rate and the level of welfare. In fact, the maximum rate of growth is achieved before welfare is maximized. The relationships between the endogenous variables and the tax are plotted in Figure 2 for three di¤erent values of . The N and the consumption-capital ratio are decreasing in , whereas the growth rate is increasing. These competing e¤ects produce a single-crossing property in welfare: it increases with for low K but decreases for high K . The N reaches high values for modest levels of the tax -so that the capital tax rapidly becomes increasingly distortionary. This is not surprising given the important role that capital plays in sustaining growth in this economy.
Tax on capital and labour
The model is now extended to make labour supply elastic. This makes it interesting to analyze a capital tax and a labour tax since both instruments are distortionary. We assume that the instantaneous utility has the Cobb-Douglas form
Labour income is taxed at rate L , and at tax of K is levied on the private capital input. The public capital input is …nanced by the tax on capital input and on the labour income. We assume, as before, that the government does not issue debt. The government budget constraint in period t is therefore
The achievement of the balanced growth path when public capital is modelled as a stock variable has been analyzed in Gómez (2004) and Turnovsky (1997) . Turnovsky assumes that investments in public capital and private capital are reversible. This allows immediate adjustment to the balanced growth path via a downward jump in one of the capital stock variables. Without reversibility it is shown by Gómez that the optimal transition path requires investment in one of the two capital variables to be zero until the balanced growth path is reached. The normalized MCF s for the two instruments are
are elasticities with respect to the tax rates. These results are …rst interpreted, and then numerically evaluated. The terms in the expression evaluate the three e¤ects that the tax changes have upon the economy. The …rst elasticity, " K L , re ‡ects the distortion of labour supply. The second, " K , concerns the e¤ect of the tax on the growth rate. The …nal elasticity, " K c , captures the impact on intertemporal allocation since it relates to the change in consumption relative to saving. It should be noted that these are not behavioral elasticities but are instead the elasticities of equilibrium values and that they depend on the tax rates at which they are evaluated. To help understand the contribution of each elasticity to the overall values of Table 1 reports the values of the elasticities for our baseline equilibrium. The table shows that the elasticity of the equilibrium consumption-capital ratio, c, and the elasticity of the equilibrium quantity of labour are negative but are small in value. The elasticity of the growth rate (which re ‡ects changes in capital accumulation) is negative and large for both taxes. However, the latter is weighted by a term involving the growth rate which for practical values (captured by the range 0 to 0.06 in our simulations) will be small. An increase 
in the (absolute) value of any of the elasticities will increase the two normalized MCF s. The expressions we have derived for two tax instruments are now numerically analyzed for a calibrated version of the model. Figure 3 shows how the growth rate, level of welfare, consumption-capital ratio, and N K for the capital tax change with the rate of tax on private capital input, for three di¤erent levels of labour income tax. In Figure 4 the roles of the capital tax and the labour tax are reversed and the N L is plotted for three values of the tax on labour income. Over the range plotted in Figure 3 one can see that the decrease in consumption with a higher rate of labour income tax in this economy is more than o¤set by the increase in the growth rate, so that for a given level of the capital tax the welfare level is higher with a higher labour tax rate. A similar pattern is observed for the capital tax. is greater than N L is a re ‡ection of the Chamley-Judd result that the optimal capital tax in a growth model should be zero (Chamley 1986 , Judd 1985 .
MCF with Infrastructural Spill-Overs
This section analyzes MCF in a two-country model that incorporates infrastructural spill-overs between countries. The discussion that follows refers to the EU context; the same analysis applies to any federal state with multiple jurisdictions. The model builds upon that in Hashimzade and Myles (2010) with the intention of capturing the important feature of the EU that productive investments by one member state have bene…ts for other neighboring states. In general, independent policy-setting by countries will lead to under-investment in infrastructure in such a setting because of the positive externality generated by the spill-over. This provides a role for a supra-national body to coordinate the decisions of individual countries so as to secure an increase in the growth rate. It also has implications for the value of the MCF. We are interested in discovering how these externalities a¤ect the value of the M CF .
The …rst step is to introduce the externality between countries caused by productive public input. Let G t and G t denote productive public input in the home and in the foreign country, respectively, and let t = G t + G t be the total public input at home and abroad. The level of output in the home country is given by
There is no externality when = 0. To simplify the analysis we assume labour is inelastic and normalize the quantity to one. The optimization problem of the home consumer is to maximize intertemporal utility taking as given the levels of capital and public good as well as the rate of growth in the foreign country. We assume that there is no redistribution of the tax revenues across countries, and that the home and the foreign countries set their tax rates independently. The home (foreign) country …nances their public spending by a tax K ( K ) on private capital input at rate , and there is no government debt. Thus, for the home country
We focus on balanced growth paths along which all real variables in all countries grow at the same rate and the tax rates are constant over time. The equality of the growth rates across countries here is imposed, since the law of motion of the public capital in one country only ensures that the growth rates of the stock of public and private capital are equal in that country, but there is no reason of why the growth rates should be equal across countries. If we did not impose this assumption then the output of one country would eventually become arbitrarily small relative to the output of the other.
When the externality from the infrastructural spill-over is present, W depends on the growth rate in both home and foreign country. Thus, in the presence of externalities, the welfare of the home consumer depends on the home tax rate through its own growth rate as well as the growth rate in the foreign country,
The details of the calculations are provided in Hashimzade and Myles (2010) . For the normalized MCF we have
where the partial derivatives of and by taking the total di¤erential of (31)-(32). The resulting expressions are cumbersome and do not provide much insight. To illustrate the pattern we present a numerical solution for a symmetric equilibrium calculated for a range of parameters. Figure 5 depicts the solution for symmetric equilibrium in the model with two identical countries. It can be seen that an increase in the extent of the spill-over (measured by ) reduces N , so that greater spill-overs decrease the cost of funding projects. One explanation for an increased spill-over could be economic integration, which suggests that the single-market programme may have consequences for the cost of …nancing public projects. The N increases with the tax rate but over the range displayed so do the growth rate and welfare.
Conclusions
The marginal cost of public funds has a central role in the assessment of tax policy and in cost-bene…t analysis. The MCF provides a measure of the cost of raising revenue through distortionary taxation that can be set against the bene…ts of a public sector project. Despite the importance of the concept the current literature has focussed upon the MCF in static settings. Only a very small literature has so far considered it within a growth setting.
In this paper we have computed the MCF in a variety of endogenous growth models with public infrastructure. To do this we have built upon the de…nition of the MCF in an intertemporal setting provided by Dahlby (2006) . The models that have been analyzed are extensions of the Barro model of productive public expenditure, but with the public input represented as a stock rather than a ‡ow. In addition, we have also introduced externalities between countries which are a consequence of spill-overs from public infrastructure. To evaluate the MCF we assume that the economy is on a balanced growth path which permits the evaluation of welfare in terms of a balanced growth rate. This technique provides a basis for determining the MCF for a variety of tax instruments in a form that can be empirically evaluated.
We have employed the standard parameter values for calibration used in real business cycle and growth models to simulate the models. Our results demonstrate that there is a link between the MCF and the growth rate, and that the MCF is sensitive to the tax rate. In the calibrated simulation the normalized MCF can take high values for quite reasonable values of tax rates. This indicates that the e¤ect upon the growth rate can exacerbate the static distortions caused by taxation. In every case the MCF is increasing and monotonic over a range of capital input and labour income tax rates similar to those seen in practice. In the model with an infrastructural spill-over it is interesting to observe that an increase in the spill-over e¤ect reduced the MCF. The analysis has been restricted here by the focus on balanced growth paths. It might be thought necessary to consider the transition path but there is limited evidence on the length of such transition. We have considered only sustained variations in tax rates and have implicitly assumed credibility of government announcements and commitment to announced policies. This removed any need to consider the formation of expectations or games played between the public and private sectors. If there is any strategic interaction this would change the value of the MCF.
7 The bene…t of these restrictions is the simpli…cation they provide to the analysis and the fact that they can be applied in a similar manner to more complex models.
The MCF is an important concept in tax policy and cost-bene…t analysis. Although it generally appears in a static setting it can be extended to growth models. Our approach to the MCF is suitable for numerical evaluation in more complex economic environments. An avenue for exploring the practical value of this methodology could be to consider the e¤ect of capital mobility upon the MCF, and to embed it in a more general model that can incorporate several countries and a broader range of tax instruments. This latter model will form the basis of empirical implementation using a combination of calibration and estimation.
t. Normalizing available labour to one, we obtain the following set of equations describing the balanced growth path
In this case there is no closed form solution for in terms of K when the dependence of g upon K is taken into account. For the present value of tax revenues we have
from which it follows that
The welfare function remains as described by (18), and so
This MCF can be used directly or, dividing by the marginal utility of income at time 0, converted into the normalized version
Using (35) in (34) we obtain
To investigate how the growth rate and the N depends on the tax rate we use implicit di¤erentiation in (35)-(36):
The expression in the numerator equals zero at the value of the tax rate given implicitly by
where e g is evaluated at = e K . Using this in (35) gives the corresponding maximum rate of growth,
From this equation
and substitution into (36) gives
Finally, using this in (40) gives, after obvious rearrangement, an implicit expression for the growth-maximizing tax rate:
The right-hand side is positive and increasing function of e K on (0; 1), and the left-hand side is positive and decreasing function of e K on ( K ; 1), where K = 1 1 G 1 + K . Therefore, a unique solution exists on (max f0; K g ; 1).
Next, for N di¤erentiation with respect to the tax rate gives
Using (39) and (36), after straightforward manipulations, we obtain
2
(1 ) (1 + )
(1 ) Ag
This is strictly positive, since g
Therefore, N is monotonically increasing in the tax rate. For the welfare function we have
where c is given by (38). Di¤erentiation with respect to the tax rate gives
In particular, this implies that at the tax rate where growth is maximized ( @ @ K = 0) the consumption to capital ratio and the welfare are increasing (
. That is, the maximum growth rate is achieved before welfare is maximized.
To verify the optimality condition in this model observe that, from (34) and @R @g = 0. Therefore, using (37),
which, again, is the marginal bene…t of the public input …nanced by lump-sum tax.
A.2 Balanced growth path and the MCF with tax on capital and labour
The private capital input is taxed at rate K . Net of tax pro…t is
From the necessary conditions for the choice of capital and labour inputs we obtain r t = A (g t L t ) 1 K ; and
where, as before, g t G t =K t . The representative consumer has intertemporal preferences
where the instantaneous utility has the Cobb-Douglas form
Labour income is taxed at rate L , and so the consumer's budget constraint is
Upon substitution of (42) and (43) into (41) we can write the …rst-order conditions for the intertemporal paths of consumption and labour supply as
The public capital input is …nanced by the tax on capital input and on the labour income. We assume, as before, that the government does not issue debt. The government budget constraint in period t is therefore
Employing the conditions developed above the balanced growth path is described by the following set of equations r = A (gL)
where c C t =K t and ! w t L t =K t . In the balanced growth path equilibrium the present value of tax revenues are given by
where " Using (50) and (52) the M CF for the two tax instruments can be expressed in terms of elasticities by
The marginal utility of income is now =(cK 0 ). Thus, the normalized M CF s for the two instruments are
To calculate the elasticities we use (44) to eliminate r from (45) to (48) and take the total di¤erential of each resulting equation holding g constant. This process produces the matrix equation
where A= 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 This equation can be solved to yield the derivatives and, hence, the elasticities with respect to the tax rates.
